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ABSTRACT 
 
Within the innovation ecosystem literature, scholars have considered governance mechanisms as an 
important instrument for focal entities to mitigate the risks of opportunistic behaviour. Scholars have 
not focused yet on how these mechanisms work. In the alliance literature, governance mechanisms 
have been extensively researched and described. As innovation ecosystems are a subset of alliances, 
constructs from the alliance literature are used to understand how governance mechanisms are 
employed by the focal entity within innovation ecosystems. Scholars have also considered the 
importance of partner alignment for successful innovations. To mitigate the risks of opportunistic 
behaviour and to align partners, this research has focused on understanding how the focal entity uses 
governance mechanisms to influence partner alignment. Based on an exploratory multiple case study 
research, this research has found a list of partner stimulators, like for example leadership and 
expectation management that influence the effectiveness of governance mechanisms used by focal 
entities in aligning partners. When partner alignment stimulators are present, the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms is enhanced and partners feel more aligned. We have also developed a 
model that explains the relation between partner alignment stimulators, governance mechanisms, 
and partner alignment. In addition, we have found that constructs from the alliance literature can be 
applied to an innovation ecosystem setting when partner alignment stimulators are considered in 
addition to governance mechanisms.  We contribute to the innovation ecosystem literature by 
explicitly considering partner alignment stimulators that influence the relation between governance 
mechanisms and partner alignment. Future research could focus on using quantitative methods to 
strengthen the findings of this research.  
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A DINÁMICA DE LA CONFIANZA Y EL CONTROL EN  
LOS ECOSISTEMAS DE INNOVACIÓN 
 
Resumen 
 
Dentro de la literatura sobre ecosistemas de innovación, los académicos han considerado los mecanismos de 
gobernanza como un instrumento importante para que las entidades focales mitiguen los riesgos de 
comportamiento oportunista. Los estudiosos aún no se han centrado en cómo funcionan estos mecanismos. 
En la literatura de la alianza, los mecanismos de gobierno han sido ampliamente investigados y descritos. 
Como los ecosistemas de innovación son un subconjunto de alianzas, los constructos de la literatura de 
alianzas se utilizan para comprender cómo los mecanismos de gobernanza son empleados por la entidad 
focal dentro de los ecosistemas de innovación. Los académicos también han considerado la importancia de 
la alineación de socios para innovaciones exitosas. Para mitigar los riesgos de comportamiento oportunista y 
para alinear a los socios, esta investigación se ha centrado en comprender cómo la entidad focal utiliza los 
mecanismos de gobierno para influir en la alineación de los socios. Sobre la base de una investigación 
exploratoria de estudios de casos múltiples, esta investigación ha encontrado una lista de estimuladores 
asociados, como por ejemplo el liderazgo y la gestión de expectativas, que influyen en la eficacia de los 
mecanismos de gobernanza utilizados por las entidades focales para alinear socios. Cuando los 
estimuladores de alineación de los socios están presentes, la efectividad de los mecanismos de 
gobernabilidad se mejora y los socios se sienten más alineados. También hemos desarrollado un modelo que 
explica la relación entre los estimuladores de alineación de socios, los mecanismos de gobierno y la 
alineación de socios. Además, hemos encontrado que las construcciones de la literatura de la alianza se 
pueden aplicar a un entorno de ecosistemas de innovación cuando se consideran los estimuladores de 
alineación de socios además de los mecanismos de gobernanza. Contribuimos a la literatura sobre 
ecosistemas de innovación considerando explícitamente los estimuladores de alineación de socios que 
influyen en la relación entre los mecanismos de gobernabilidad y la alineación de socios. La investigación 
futura podría centrarse en el uso de métodos cuantitativos para fortalecer los hallazgos de esta 
investigación. 
 
Palabras clave: ecosistema de innovación, mecanismos de gobierno, entidad focal, alianzas, control de 
resultados, control social, control de comportamiento, confianza de competencia, confianza de buena 
voluntad, alineación de socios, capacidades de gestión de alianzas. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Innovation ecosystems have the 
potential to produce innovations for sustained 
industrial competitiveness by offering an 
innovative environment that allows for 
multidisciplinary collaboration (Adner, 2006; 
Wang, 2009). These ecosystems are 
collaborative agreements where a wide variety 
of partners combine their individual 
technologies and/or services into a valuable 
innovation. Typically, a focal entity governs this 
arrangement (Gobble, 2014) and facilitates joint 
value capture and creation via partner 
alignment (Adner, 2006; Adner and Kapoor, 
2010; Adner, 2017).  
Value capture and creation within 
ecosystems represents a complicated process as 
it can be difficult to create a sense of collective 
value (Lopes-Berzosa and Gawer, 2014) and/or 
to ensure that actors behave in congruence with 
the interest of the ecosystem instead of 
behaving opportunistically - that is acting out of 
self-interest (Boudreau, 2010). When partners in 
an innovation ecosystem perceive a risk of 
opportunistic behaviour, they will do everything 
to protect themselves (Das and Teng, 1998; Das 
and Teng, 2001).  
To mitigate the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour, governance mechanisms, that is trust 
and control based governance mechanisms, can 
be used (Gulati, 1995; De Man and Roijakkers, 
2008). These mechanisms can be used by the 
focal entity to safeguard the system against 
opportunistic behaviour by creating mutual 
agreement (partner alignment).  
Trust-based governance mechanisms 
aim to reduce opportunistic behaviour by 
creating internally motivated actors by the 
presence of trust (De Man and Roijakkers, 2008; 
Gulati, 1995) whereas control-based governance 
mechanisms do so by means of formal rules and 
procedures (De Man and Roijakkers, 2008).  
Within the innovation ecosystem 
literature, the importance of both trust 
(Bercovitz, Jap, and Nickerson, 2006; Autio and 
Thomas, 2014) and control-based governance 
mechanisms (Adner and Kapoor, 2010) as well 
as the role of the focal entity in its 
implementation (Adner, 2017; Jacobides, 
Cennamo, and Gawer, 2018) have been 
considered as driving factors for partner 
alignment. To the best of our knowledge no 
research has been done yet to understand the 
implementation of governance mechanisms by 
the focal entity in innovation ecosystems.  
Therefore scholars call for more 
research (e.g., Maes and Roijakkers, 2017; De 
Man and Roijakkers, 2008; Adner, 2017). So far, 
initial research regarding innovation ecosystems 
has been mainly based on interviews with focal 
entities (Vanhaverbeke, 2017); the opinions of 
the partners within ecosystems were often not 
considered.  
As a result, there are not many insights 
yet on the internal dynamics within innovation 
ecosystems. To the best of our knowledge no 
empirical research has been done yet 
concerning the use of governance mechanisms 
by focal entities nor on the alignment of 
partners within innovation ecosystems (Meier, 
Lütkewitte, and Mellewigt, 2016; Adner, 2017).  
Though no empirical research has been 
done yet within innovation ecosystems, trust 
and control-based governance mechanisms 
have been extensively researched in the alliance 
literature (e.g., Gulati, 1995; Hagedoorn, 
Roijakkers, and Van Kranenburg, 2008; De Man 
and Roijakkers, 2008). In the alliance literature, 
several types of both trust and control-based 
governance mechanisms have been identified 
(Das and Teng, 1998; Das and Teng, 2001). 
Innovation ecosystems are seen as a specific 
subset of alliances and networks (Gulati, 
Puranam, and Tushman, 2012); they have 
specific properties that distinguish them, for 
instance, their focus (Adner, 2017).  
Given their specificities, it remains 
unclear whether we can directly use concepts 
from the alliance literature within an innovation 
ecosystem context. Research is required to 
understand how governance mechanisms are 
used within innovation ecosystems.  
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As many unknowns remain in the use of 
governance mechanisms, many questions still 
remain. For instance, how are governance 
mechanisms used by focal entities within an 
innovation ecosystem context? And how 
effective are these governance mechanisms in 
aligning partners? Are focal entities able to align 
the partners in the ecosystem? As such, a need 
exists to further investigate the use of 
governance mechanism by focal entities in the 
context of innovation ecosystems. Therefore 
this article tackles the following research 
question: 
How does the focal entity use governance 
mechanisms to influence partner alignment 
within the innovation ecosystem? 
 
We address this question by means of 
an exploratory multiple case study with cases in 
the fields of blockchain, artificial intelligence, 
climate change, and sustainability. The results 
show that constructs from the alliance literature 
can be applied to an innovation ecosystem 
context only when an additional variable is 
considered; the partner alignment stimulator. 
When these stimulators are present, the focal 
entity is more effective in aligning partners via 
the use of governance mechanisms.  
This implies that we augment the 
innovation ecosystem literature by 
understanding how the focal entity implements 
governance mechanisms within innovation 
ecosystems and what its effect is on partners 
within an innovation ecosystem.  
By building upon the extant literature on 
alliances, this research provides an initial 
attempt to connect the fields of alliance and 
ecosystem literature to understand how 
different types of governance mechanisms are 
used by focal entities within innovation 
ecosystems and how this influences partner 
alignment.  
Whereas most existing research has not 
focused yet on the how-question, this research 
is one of the first that provides insights in the 
dynamics of governance mechanisms in 
innovation ecosystems through empirical 
research. 
The following section starts with an 
explanation of the innovation ecosystem and 
alliance concepts. Next, trust and control as 
governance mechanisms are characterized. 
After the theoretical aspects are explained, the 
method used to answer the research question is 
described. Next, the results of the study and a 
model are discussed. This research concludes 
with a discussion on how trust and control are 
used by focal entities in innovation ecosystems 
to influence partner alignment.  
 
THEORETICAL REFERENCE FRAMEWORK 
 
Firms have typically opted for internal 
innovation development. However, to respond 
quickly to complex changes in technology and 
customer demands, firms have started to 
collaborate with all kind of partners in the last 
two decades. Both innovation ecosystems and 
alliances are examples of collaborations 
between firms. Gulati et al. (2012) have stated 
that ecosystems partly overlap with alliances, 
forming a specific subset of alliances. Though in 
essence they both aim at collaboration, 
innovation ecosystems and alliances both have 
their own specificities.  
 
First, alliances focus on the firm level, 
whereas innovation ecosystems focus on 
activities.  
 
Second, in alliances the real purpose of 
the collaboration is often not revealed and value 
propositions are often not known, whereas in 
innovation ecosystems value propositions are 
leading (e.g. in attracting the right partners).  
 
Third, alliances are generally not 
focused on developing knowledge and 
inventions, whereas ecosystems do specifically 
focus on these two activities (Adner, 2017).  
 
Last and contrarily to alliances, 
ecosystems do not always contain formal 
alliances or binding forms (Jacobides et al., 
2018). Innovation ecosystems are thus a stand-
alone concept, requiring structure and resolved 
coordination challenges (Jacobides et al., 2018).  
Different forms of trust and control-
based governance mechanisms and different 
risk types were identified in the alliance 
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literature. As trust and control-based 
governance mechanisms have not been 
researched yet in an innovation ecosystem 
setting and innovation ecosystems are seen as a 
subset of alliances, in this article, definitions 
from the alliance literature regarding 
governance mechanisms are applied within an 
innovation ecosystem context. This is done to 
understand how focal entities use governance 
mechanisms in an innovation ecosystem context 
and how it influences the alignment of partners. 
In the following subsections the concepts 
innovation ecosystem, alliance, and governance 
mechanisms are briefly explained.  
 
Innovation ecosystems  
 
The innovation ecosystem is a unique 
collaboration where several actors combine 
their individual offerings into a specific 
innovation solution (Autio and Thomas, 2014). 
More specifically, these ecosystems involve 
relations that are not decomposable into a 
combination of multiple bilateral relations.  
A wide variety of actors contribute 
material resources and human capital and 
collaboratively form the institutional 
environment required for successful innovation 
(Jackson, 2015). To materialize a value 
proposition, an alignment structure for the 
multilateral set of partners is required (Adner, 
2017). Innovation ecosystems can deliver high-
tech solutions that firms are less likely to deliver 
on their own (Autio and Thomas, 2014; Adner 
and Kapoor, 2010).  
Innovation ecosystems are typically 
governed by a focal entity. This entity can be 
either a technology platform, a set of social or 
economic conditions or a company (Gobble, 
2014). The focal entity develops the ecosystem’s 
strategy, institutional system, and governs the 
technological architecture (Adner and Kapoor, 
2010; Autio and Thomas, 2014). Often, a focal 
entity first develops a value proposition and 
then tries to attract partners that are capable of 
contributing to the proposition.  
Focal entities often use their position to 
control the technological architecture or value-
creating brand to enhance their own 
performance (Autio and Thomas, 2014). The 
ability of the focal entity to manage the network 
depends on its ability to influence and control 
the ecosystem, the match between the focal 
entity’s goal and the ecosystem’s goal, and the 
structure of the ecosystem (Möller, Rajala, and 
Svahn, 2005). 
The success of an innovation developed 
by an innovation ecosystem depends on many 
different actors  (Adner, 2006; Wang, 2009) as a 
variety of modules developed by different actors 
are combined into a (technological) solution 
(Mercan and Göktas, 2011; Wang, 2009). 
Members have their own internal challenges - 
either upstream (suppliers) or downstream 
(complementors) - in the development process 
of their specific part that have to be resolved 
before an innovation can be delivered to 
customers (Adner and Kapoor, 2010).  
Only when the focal entity, upstream 
component partners and downstream 
complementary partners cooperate, challenges 
can be resolved (Song, 2016). In order to 
collaborate and to solve the (internal) 
challenges, mutual agreement among partners 
is required.  
Only when a focal entity is able to 
recognize that the interests of all partners have 
to be in line and that every partner has different 
perceptions of uncertainties and different 
strategies to handle these uncertainties, 
partners have an incentive to contribute to the 
ecosystem (Leavy, 2012; Gomes, Salerno, Phaal, 
and Probert, 2018).  
The extent to which mutual agreement 
exists, expressed in terms of positions and flows, 
is also known as the level of alignment between 
partners. Mainly at the start of innovation 
ecosystems partners are still searching for 
compatible incentives and motives. When 
ecosystem development is more mature, the 
level of alignment often increases (Adner, 2017).  
Partner alignment can be measured as 
the extent to which the focal entity and partners 
within the innovation ecosystem understand 
each other’s interests and uncertainties (Adner, 
2017; Leavy, 2012). The focal entity is 
responsible for partner alignment (Adner, 2017).  
 
Alliances 
 
Alliances are defined by Gulati (1995) as 
agreements between two or more firms 
regarding the pooling of resources to explore 
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and exploit market opportunities. Alliances are 
used to retrieve resources and competences 
that are not internally available for firms. The 
transaction costs for starting and managing an 
alliance are lower than the costs to get 
acquainted with new knowledge from scratch.  
Alliances are used by firms to obtain 
competitive advantages, to acquire new 
technologies, to enter new markets, to share 
risk with others, to establish economies of scale 
or to access complementary resources and 
technologies (Gulati, 1995). It can be a difficult 
process for firms to fully obtain the benefits 
from alliances as firms are mostly self-interested 
(opportunistic) and try to retrieve as much 
knowledge as possible for themselves (Leroi-
Werelds, Pop and Roijakkers, 2017). 
Collaborating companies put none to little effort 
in developing a common strategy; alliances rely 
upon the individual strategies of the involved 
companies (Roijakkers and Hagedoorn, 2006).   
To manage the success of alliances, 
firms use alliance management capabilities. 
These capabilities comprise the capability of a 
firm to handle or manage an alliance (Anand and 
Khanna, 2000).  
Alliance management capabilities are 
important as industries often develop in 
unexpected ways, making it a serious challenge 
for firms to manage their dynamics (Van de Ven 
and Polley, 1992; Madhok and Tallman, 1998).  
Six alliance management capabilities are 
crucial: coordination, communication, bonding 
(Schreiner, Kale, and Corsten., 2009), 
interorganizational learning, sensing, and 
transformation (Schilke and Goerzen, 2010; 
Gomes et al., 2018).  
Capabilities are developed by firms 
having either experience (Siminon, 1997; Hoang 
and Rothaermel, 2005) or taking deliberate 
actions to develop structural mechanisms (Kale, 
Dyer, and Singh, 2002). Alliance management 
capabilities mediate the effect between 
governance structures and alliance performance 
(Schilke and Goerzen, 2010).  
 
Governance mechanisms  
 
In alliances, different reasons are found 
that result in a lack of trust; uncertainties in the 
environment, the incomplete nature of 
contracts, bounded rationality, and the 
behaviour of partners (opportunism) 
(Williamson, 1975). To prevent opportunistic 
behaviour (e.g. evasion and violation of 
agreements (Wathne and Heide, 2000)), firms 
use governance mechanisms – either trust or 
control-based (Gulati, 1995).  
Control-based governance mechanisms 
aim at reducing the likelihood that a partner 
behaves in an opportunistic manner and 
protects the company via the use of formal rules 
and procedures (De Man and Roijakkers, 2008; 
Das and Teng, 2001).  
The use of control-based governance 
mechanisms makes it more expensive for 
organizations to implement activities that only 
benefit their own goals. The consequences of 
opportunistic behaviour are stipulated in 
contracts (i.e. fines) (Parkhe, 1993).  
Control also specifies the labour division 
between firms; it functions as a guideline for the 
integration of activities, decision-making and 
how to act in case of disagreements (Faems, 
Janssens, Madhok, and Van Looy, 2008). There 
are different instruments to exercise control 
(Poppo and Zenger, 2002; Das and Teng, 2001; 
De Man, 2006).  
Control can be classified into external 
measure-based control and internal value-based 
control. External measure-based control focuses 
on the establishment of formal rules, 
procedures, and policies to monitor and reward 
desirable outcome (Das and Teng, 2001). This 
form of control can be categorized into 
behavioural control and output control.  
Behavioural control focuses on 
influencing the behaviour of partner firms via, 
for example, reporting devices, written notice of 
departure from agreements, accounting 
examinations, cost and quality controls, 
arbitration clauses and lawsuit provisions (Das 
and Teng, 1998).  
Output control focuses on defining the 
preferred output of an alliance via setting 
alliance goals, establishment of incentive 
systems and reward structures, and formal 
monitoring procedures (Dekker, 2004).  
Internal value-based control, also known 
as social- or clan control, focuses on the 
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establishment of organizational norms, values, 
culture, and the internationalization of goals to 
encourage desirable behaviour and outcome 
(Das and Teng, 2001).  
Social control does not define behaviour 
or output; it rather focuses on socialization via 
the development of organizational consensus. It 
aims at developing organizational norms, values, 
culture, and the internalization of goals to 
encourage desirable behaviour and outcomes 
(Das and Teng, 1998; Das and Teng, 2001).  
In contrast to control, trust is presented 
in the literature as a more flexible governance 
form; it is based on positive expectations of 
partners. The more firms cooperate, the more 
trust increases and the less control is used 
(Gulati, 1995).  
When trust-based governance 
mechanisms are used, every partner is allowed 
to join, leadership is decentralized, and cultural 
differences are valued leading to more long-
term relations (De Man, 2006).  
The aim is to reach complementary 
goals with internally motivated actors that trust 
one another (De Man and Roijakkers, 2008; 
Gulati, 1995). In the case of trust, firms worry 
less about opportunistic behaviour and, as such, 
reduce control-specific actions (Das and Teng, 
2001).  
In unpredictable environments, trust is a 
valuable mechanism as contracts are not able to 
fully capture the market dynamics (De Man and 
Roijakkers, 2008).  
An initial level of mutual trust is 
required to start arrangements (Hagedoorn et 
al., 2008). Repeated ties (e.g. common history of 
collaborations) increase the level of trust 
(Hagedoorn et al., 2008; Gulati, 1995; 
Roijakkers, 2003).  
Two different types of trust are 
classified; goodwill and competence trust. 
Goodwill trust focused on the expectation that a 
partner intends to fulfill its role and is influenced 
by previous experience with a partner.  
Therefore, the goodwill is based on 
attitudes of specific personnel, also described as 
trust guardians (Child, 2001).  
Goodwill trust is based on attitudes of 
specific personnel, previous experience or a 
common history (Lui and Ngo, 2004; Das and 
Teng, 1998; Das and Teng, 2001).  
Competence trust is based on the 
expectation that a partner has the ability to 
fulfill its role and is based on resources and 
reputation of a partner (Das and Teng, 1998; 
Das and Teng, 2001).  
In this section, different concepts were 
explained to understand the insights that the 
existing literature provides.  
We have found that in the ecosystem 
literature the importance of governance 
mechanisms is only sparsely considered; 
scholars have only briefly mentioned, mainly in 
the form of future research directions, that 
governance mechanisms are important, but 
seem to show none to little understanding of 
how these mechanisms are exactly used and 
implemented by the focal entity within 
innovation ecosystems.  
Also, findings regarding innovation 
ecosystems are mainly based on research of 
focal entities, ignoring the importance of other 
partners within innovation ecosystems. In the 
alliance literature governance mechanisms have 
been extensively described, also in relation to 
different types of alliances.  
In the alliance literature also the use of 
management capabilities is described, which 
according to that literature stream, mediates 
the relation between governance structures and 
alliance performance.  
As the innovation ecosystem has its own 
specificities compared to alliances, this article 
investigates whether it is meaningful to apply 
governance mechanisms as described in the 
alliance literature directly to innovation 
ecosystems and whether a construct 
comparable to alliance management capabilities 
is present in innovation ecosystems.  
Still, as innovation ecosystems are a 
subset of alliances, it could be interesting to use 
the general definitions of different types of 
governance mechanisms from the alliance 
literature and investigate how governance 
mechanisms are used by focal entities within an 
innovation ecosystem setting.  
When it is understood how the focal 
entities use governance mechanisms within 
innovation ecosystems, it also can be 
understood how focal entities influence partner 
alignment within the innovation ecosystem by 
means of these mechanisms.  
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METHOD 
Methodology 
 
This research was conducted by means 
of theoretical sampling, including four cases 
(Eisenhardt and Graebner, 2007). During this 
process, theory was generated by collecting and 
analyzing data at the same time.  
The initial data generation was based on 
the overarching research topics; governance 
mechanisms, alliance management capabilities, 
and innovation ecosystems (Eisenhardt and 
Graebner, 2007).  
The four cases were selected based on 
their suitability to elaborate upon the 
relationships between the constructs of interest.  
More specifically, this research aimed at 
understanding how the focal entity within an 
innovation ecosystem influences the dynamics 
within the innovation ecosystem by means of 
governance mechanisms. 
This study has an inductive character 
meaning that existing literature regarding 
alliances and innovation ecosystems was used to 
understand the use of different governance 
mechanisms by a focal entity and its 
effectiveness in aligning partners.  
An exploratory multiple case study 
approach was chosen to enable initial research 
on the use of concepts from the alliance 
literature within innovation ecosystem research 
and to enable the identification of emerging 
themes (Edmonson and McManus, 2007).  
A qualitative research design is 
appropriate, considering the limited 
understanding of the use of governance 
mechanisms in the innovation ecosystem 
literature, suggesting a need for explorative 
research (Adner, 2017).  
Additionally, the impact of governance 
mechanisms on the partners within innovation 
ecosystems has not been considered yet, 
suggesting a further need for explorative 
research.  
Third, it is not understood yet whether a 
moderating or mediating variable, comparable 
to alliance management capabilities, exists that 
influence the relation between governance 
structures and partner alignment within 
innovation ecosystems.  
Last, the complexity and dynamic 
character of governance mechanisms in 
innovation ecosystems suggest a need for 
empirical research to create a first 
understanding of its implementation.  
 
Case selection 
 
All four cases reflect innovation 
ecosystems that focus on providing solutions to 
complex challenges. Also, all four cases display a 
combination of both control and trust-based 
governance mechanisms that are implemented 
by the focal entity.  
Relatively young ecosystems were 
chosen, as starting ecosystems are the most 
appropriate for displaying the dynamics of 
governance mechanisms. More specifically, at 
the start, partners still have to align to find 
compatible incentives and motives.  
Over time, activities, actors, positions, 
and links become stable and the impact of (new) 
governance mechanisms is likely to decrease 
and then it can become more difficult to 
understand the dynamics (Autio and Thomas, 
2013; Adner, 2017).  
Notably, the cases differ in, for example, 
their industrial background, number of actors, 
actor sizes, actor types, used technology, 
institutional environment and location - aiding 
generalizability of the results in case of 
comparable results (Eisenhardt and Graebner, 
2007).  
As all cases are still substantially 
different, the reliability of the research is 
discussable.  
Still, as procedures have been followed 
and documented, external reviewers could 
check the reliability of this case study method by 
repeating the procedures for the same case 
study (Yin, 2013).  
The researched ecosystems were 
labeled as innovation ecosystems as they all 
fulfill a number of conditions of innovation 
ecosystems.  
First, each ecosystem is managed by a 
focal entity that orchestrates the ecosystem 
(Autio and Thomas, 2014; Adner and Kapoor, 
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2010; Adner, 2017). Also, the participants of the 
ecosystem deliver the input for innovation; 
suppliers, research and educational 
organizations, and customers are integrated into 
the innovation process (Adner and Kapoor, 
2010).  
Third, in all ecosystems the partner 
alignment structure is under development 
(Adner, 2017). Last, the relationships in the four 
ecosystems are not decomposable to bilateral 
interactions (Adner, 2017). 
 
Data collection and data sources 
 
We collected data by means of 
conducting semi-structured interviews and by 
consulting a variety of (online) sources of 
documentation.  
The first step of the data collection was 
to understand how the focal entity uses 
governance mechanisms in innovation 
ecosystems. The second step was to understand 
the impact of governance mechanisms 
implemented on partners within the ecosystem.  
The third step was to find out whether 
moderating or mediating variables are present 
that influence the relation between governance 
structures and innovation ecosystem 
performance. Looking beyond the focal entity 
makes data collection more complex, but 
enhances insights as single-respondent bias in a 
network context is prevented (Eisenhardt, 
1989).  
Semi-structured interviews (22 in total) 
with key persons (i.e., representatives of 
organizations) were the most important 
information source. The interviews were 
conducted with both focal entities and partners 
active within the ecosystems.  
When interviewees mentioned the use 
of a governance mechanisms or when signs of 
ineffectiveness were found, follow-up questions 
were asked to discover how and why they were 
implemented and what their impact was.  
The questions for the interviews were 
based on both the alliance and innovation 
ecosystem literature. Interviews were continued 
until convergence was achieved. Interviews 
were conducted by the same researcher for the 
sake of consistency. The interviewees were 
found via a chain-referral sampling approach; in 
all four cases, the focal entity (known via 
personal networks) from the specific case 
provided us with the contact details of other 
potential interviewees.  
Additionally, (online) documentation 
and company documents were used as 
secondary data sources. These data sources 
were used to describe the context of the cases 
and as complementary sources to the interview 
results.  
The combination of different sources, 
i.e. triangulation, was used to overcome possible 
biases and problems that could arise by the use 
of only one data source. As such, the validity of 
the results increases (Yin, 2013). 
 
Data analysis 
 
For the analysis, summaries of the 
interviews and (online) documentation were 
generated. Results from the four different cases 
were constantly compared and merged into a 
coherent story regarding governance 
mechanisms.  
In the alliance literature (e.g. De Man and 
Roijakkers, 2008), the implementation of 
governance mechanisms has been extensively 
described, whereas in the innovation ecosystem 
literature its implementation only has been 
sparsely considered.  
To understand the use of governance 
mechanisms in an innovation ecosystem setting, 
first data was analysed to have a first grasp of 
how both trust and control were used in 
innovation ecosystems.  
Then first-order themes were constructed 
by categorising the data (interview results and 
documentation) into characteristics that could 
belong to different types of trust and control. 
The first-order themes aimed at understanding 
the characteristics of trust and control within 
innovation ecosystems.  
Then second-order themes were 
constructed where main constructs from the 
alliance literature (e.g. output, social, and 
behavioural control and competence and 
goodwill trust) were coupled to the different 
categories of trust and control that were 
identified within innovation ecosystems.  
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The second-order themes were used to 
relate constructs from the alliance literature to 
categories of trust and control in an innovation 
ecosystem context. An overview of the coding 
can be found in table 1. 
 
Table 1 Coding and evidence  
Evidence by source First-order themes Second-order themes 
 Interviews 
 
 Output not known/constantly changing; 
 System too dynamic for output definition. 
Output control 
 Interviews 
 Secondary data  
 Common culture development; 
 Business meetings; 
 Joint activities; 
 Joint goal development; 
 Coaches;  
 Communication;   
 Education; 
 Community creation. 
Social control  
 Interviews  Role definition; 
 Governance structures; 
 Responsibility definition; 
 Conflict management; 
 Structural agreements. 
Behavioural control 
 
 
 
 
 Interviews 
 Secondary data 
 Letter of intent; 
 Gentleman agreements; 
 Moral responsibility; 
 Open communication; 
 Previous interactions; 
 Staff attitude. 
Goodwill trust 
 Interviews  Required resources and knowledge; 
 Reputation; 
 Attractive partners; 
 Capability to fulfil appointments. 
Competence trust 
 
 
 
As innovation ecosystems are a subset 
of alliances, we presumed that in innovation 
ecosystems, a comparable concept to alliance 
management capabilities might be found. 
Indeed, a comparable construct, i.e. partner 
alignment stimulator, was found, that also 
influences the relation between the governance 
structure and partner alignment.  
The governance structure in innovation 
ecosystems is a combination of several trust and 
control-based governance mechanisms. We 
define partner alignment as the extent to which 
the impact that the focal entity would like to 
reach by implementing governance mechanisms 
is in line with how the partners within 
innovation ecosystems experience the impact of 
governance mechanisms. An overview of these 
relevant partner alignment stimulators can be 
found in table 2.  
Our insights as to how governance 
mechanisms are implemented emerged 
inductively, based on our coding and existing 
literature (Yin, 2013). 
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Table 2 Partner alignment stimulators 
Governance type Relevant partner alignment stimulator 
Output control - 
Social control 
 Leadership; 
 Expectation management; 
 Trust. 
Behavioural control 
 Open discussion; 
 Communication; 
 Commitment; 
 Trust; 
 Leadership. 
Goodwill trust 
 Leadership; 
 Internal organizational support; 
 Communication; 
 Character of organization; 
 Continuation. 
Competence trust 
 Innovation department; 
 Resource allocation; 
 Reputation; 
 Foundation; 
 Fear of competition; 
 Representatives; 
 External factors. 
 
 
Case descriptions 
 
 Sustainability 
 
In a small municipality in the 
Netherlands, a diverse group of public and 
private partners (e.g. educational and 
governmental organizations and companies) 
started to collaborate to renovate and exploit an 
old centre that once focused on projects in the 
field of living, energy generation, food 
production, waste processing, and savings on 
raw materials.  
The collaboration aims at creating a 
sustainable, self-providing community and 
focuses at four different programs: the built 
environment, bio-based techniques/food, 
energy transition, and social transition.  
The location itself fulfils educational 
purposes, inspiration, testing facilities (living 
labs), and reintegration of people that are 
distanced from the labour market. As a number 
of partners are not allowed to take any risks, a 
foundation was started that aims at the 
realization of its goals.  
 
 
 
 Incubator program   
 
The remaining cases are also located in 
the Netherlands, all at a one campus. As the 
three cases have the same underlying structures, 
first this structure is briefly explained.  
The campus aims at connecting large 
firms, research institutions, start-ups, and 
students to innovate together. To stimulate 
innovation processes, an incubation program has 
been developed to facilitate the connections 
between people and eventually stimulate 
innovation by connecting partners, build a 
community, and disseminate knowledge within 
an ecosystem setting. The development program 
has three different focus areas; blockchain, 
artificial intelligence and climate change. The 
innovation process is facilitated by coaches.  
Though the following three focus areas 
are part of the same development program, 
each case is substantially different in terms of, 
for example, its maturity, leader, type and 
numbers of partners, innovation focus, main 
technology and organizational aspects. 
Therefore each focus area is treated as a 
separate case study. Each different focus area 
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fulfils the characteristics of an innovation 
ecosystem. In the following subsections the 
three different focus areas are briefly explained.   
 
 Blockchain  
 
Blockchain is trending; firms are 
increasingly researching its potential impact and 
(future) applications. Inspired by the trend, 
blockchain became one of the three focus areas 
of the incubation program. The blockchain track 
aims at using advanced, internet-based 
technology as a potential source of trust, 
prosperity, equality, and security for society and 
business. The blockchain track is led by a 
research organisation specialised in blockchain. 
Next to a Dutch research organisation, also a 
banking house, pension fund, consultancy firms 
and technology firms are part of the ecosystem.  
 
 Artificial intelligence 
 
Not only blockchain, but also artificial 
intelligence is an upcoming technological 
research field. Its potential applications are 
under research by a wide variety of 
organisations.  
The artificial intelligence project aims at 
connecting business, research, and education to 
develop tools to support humans in various 
situations and provide services for improving 
business processes. The artificial intelligence 
case is led by a collaboration of several research 
institutions.  
This collaboration integrates and 
connects education, business, and research and 
is a collaboration of different research 
institutions and universities. Its unique network 
and knowledge position connects a number of 
interesting partners that could contribute to 
innovations in the field of artificial intelligence. 
Not only an institution, but also consultancy 
firms, a pension fund, educational organizations, 
and research institutions take part in the project.  
 
 Climate change  
 
Whereas the block chain and artificial 
intelligence tracks were born out of 
technological trends, the climate change track 
was inspired by the increasing call for 
sustainability and the lack of concrete action to 
reach the goals agreed upon in the Paris Climate 
Summit.                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                  
Next to technological knowledge, it aims 
at showing the members of the climate change 
community which impact they have as an 
individual to inspire them to handle climate 
change differently inside their company as a 
professional. In that way, they are stimulated to 
develop new business models and concepts to, if 
possible, use new technologies as accelerators.  
The climate change track is led by a 
pension service provider that has a very 
innovative focus. The company not only 
integrates its innovative methods in the project, 
but is also responsible for aligning its activities to 
the general program, stimulating ecosystem 
development, and developing use cases.  
 
RESULTS 
 
We now explain how three types of 
control and two types of trust are used by focal 
entities within innovation ecosystems. We also 
explain for every governance type how its use by 
the focal entity has influenced the alignment of 
partners. In table 3 an overview of the 
representative quotes can be found. 
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Table 3 Representative quotes 
Theme Representative quotes 
Output control  “The desired output has been changing over the years as a result of changes in 
employees inside organisations, destination plans, potential subsidies.” (Senior 
manager governmental organization) 
 “The output was not clear, but you should not want to have it clear as we are not 
working in a solution-driven manner.’’ (Senior manager business) 
Social control  “Using key persons that know other persons well, let them have dinner together 
and creating open discussions can result in a feeling of trust.” (Senior manager 
governmental organization) 
 “Coaches in the project are there to create the right mind set and commitment.” 
(Middle manager research organization) 
 “We made quite some steps, to get everyone on the same knowledge level.” 
(Senior manager research organization) 
 “A common point of departure on common problems creates commitment.” 
(Senior manager business) 
Behavioural 
control 
 “There is a functional partnership agreement, but partnership agreement and 
foundation are not in line.” (Senior manager governmental organization) 
 “It is not clear where responsibilities start and end.” (Senior manager foundation) 
 “There is no clear leader in the project.” (Director educational organization) 
 “It is determined upfront for each project how many resources everyone puts in 
the project, but capturing is a large word; it rather is discussed verbally.” (Middle 
manager research organization) 
 “We search for mental commitment and then we will have a look what roles fit and 
which business models.” (Senior manager business) 
Goodwill trust  “The collective is less collective than the name would imply; the only thing that 
connected them was the location.” (Director governmental organization) 
 “When you start collaborating with a new partner, it takes a while before you know 
each other but eventually you will get to know each other.” (Senior manager 
banking) 
 “We talked about trust, what we will do, what is important, what we want, how we 
stand in the projects. Matter of transparency.” (Senior manager business) 
 “As a result of partner X in the collaboration, partner Y was not completely open.” 
(Senior manager banking) 
Competence trust  “It depends per partner, but they certainly have the resources, but it can be 
questioned how much they want to allocate to innovation.” (Middle manager 
research organization) 
 “Not the right resources in knowledge available as a result of laws and 
regulations.” (Director business) 
 “I do think that they have the right resources, but they have to put forward smart 
people.” (Senior manager business) 
 “Some organisations have their own innovation department and then you see that 
they have time available whereas others do not prioritize it.” (Senior manager 
business) 
 
Output control: is it even possible?  
 
Output control can only be defined 
when the eventual output of an ecosystem is 
known (Das and Teng, 1998). Partners in the 
four innovation ecosystems agreed that the 
output was constantly changing. We observed 
that, until now, in three innovation ecosystems 
solutions were found in surprising fields with 
unique combinations of partners that could 
never be imagined upfront. In one innovation 
ecosystem partners developed a common goal 
that implied a future output. However, the focal 
entity soon realized that this output could not 
be realized within the current setting and that 
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output control was not possible, as illustrated by 
the following quote: 
“The desired output as described in the vision 
document is difficult to be realized with the 
currently available human capital and money.”  
(Senior manager governmental organization) 
In three innovation ecosystems the goal 
of the ecosystem was to create disruptive 
innovation. These innovations can disrupt 
existing markets, but upfront it is not known 
whether they will actually disrupt and in what 
way. One focal entity added that the specific 
nature of the program the ecosystem belonged 
to did not allow for a clear upfront view of the 
output; the program was not working in a 
solution-driven manner.  
As the output was not clear yet and still 
changing, it was difficult to define how to 
control it. The ecosystems were not in a stable 
position yet and still very dynamic as partners 
were still being added, common goals were 
being developed, and social consensus was not 
reached yet. It is questionable whether focal 
entities are ever able to use output control in 
innovation ecosystems to manage their 
enduring dynamic character. As output control 
was not used, focal entities thus did not 
influence partner alignment via output control. 
To summarize, in all four innovation ecosystems 
output could not be defined neither controlled. 
 
Social control: the power of 
consensus and socialization 
 
We observed that social control was 
widely used by focal entities within innovation 
ecosystems. Focal entities used social control 
already at the start of the ecosystem to create 
social consensus and a feeling of understanding 
and cohesion. Social control was mainly 
dominant at the start, as partners did not know 
each other yet, resulting in a lack of cohesion 
and consensus. We observed that the 
implementation of social control was a time-
consuming process for focal entities, as it can be 
difficult to realize social consensus and a feeling 
of cohesion; focal entities constantly 
experimented with respect to how social control 
could be used. Focal entities used social control 
as long as they felt that social consensus was not 
fully reached. At the time of this research, social 
control was still used in the four innovation 
ecosystems.  
A feeling of consensus was developed 
via the development of a common culture, the 
creation of a community, business meetings, 
joint activities, and joint goal development. In 
three innovation ecosystems, also coaches were 
used to create a feeling of commitment and the 
right mindset and to educate partners to use the 
same innovation development initiation 
processes. In one innovation ecosystem, the 
focal entity explicitly used social control to 
create commitment via a common point of 
departure, as illustrated by the following quote: 
“A common point of departure with respect to 
common problem creates commitment.” (Senior 
manager business) 
Focal entities also used social control to 
create an innovative community where people 
no longer represented companies, but 
themselves. Despite the efforts, in two 
innovation ecosystems the use of social control 
did not align partners; several partners felt that 
no common culture, feelings of cohesion or 
consensus were found, though the focal entities 
of these ecosystems felt that these aspects were 
actually present. The focal entities shared the 
opinion that a common culture and goal were 
found, that partners became closer, and that 
knowledge gaps decreased. Several partners felt 
that they were not included and that no 
common culture and goal existed, mainly as a 
result of only a limited number of face-to-face 
meetings, as illustrated by the following quote: 
“There is no common culture; the members of 
the management team have seen each other 
one time this year.”  
(Director business) 
Within one innovation ecosystem, we 
observed that partners experienced the vision 
document as written behind a desk, without 
further considering the actual implementation. 
Thus a mismatch in expectations was found 
between the focal entities and the partners of 
two innovation ecosystems; they experienced 
the impact of social control differently. It is not 
clear whether the focal entities ever checked 
whether the partners experienced a feeling of 
cohesion and inclusion. The partners within 
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these two ecosystems did not feel aligned, 
though we observed that the partners felt a bit 
closer at the time of this research than at the 
start of the ecosystem.  
In two innovation ecosystems, focal 
entities succeeded in aligning partners by the 
use of social control, as illustrated by the 
following quote:  
“Partners that are collaborating for a while are 
quicker and more flexible in the innovation 
process.”  
(Senior manager banking) 
In these innovation ecosystems, 
partners experienced a common culture and 
understood the role of the coaches and the way 
communication was used to cultivate the 
common culture. One focal entity emphasized 
that in his ecosystem, the implementation of 
social control was a time-consuming process, 
which required many iterations. Social control in 
this innovation ecosystem was successfully 
implemented as a result of extensive managerial 
efforts and constant learning loops. In the 
second innovation ecosystem, partners 
experienced social control as being used 
positively as a result of trust between the 
partners. Still, partners noted that the common 
culture could be further improved upon. Overall, 
the focal entities succeeded in socializing and 
reaching consensus resulting in partner 
alignment. 
The four innovation ecosystems show 
that the implementation of social control is a 
challenging process within innovation 
ecosystems. Two focal entities did not check 
whether social consensus was reached. In two 
out of four innovation ecosystems social control 
did not have the impact the focal entities aimed 
for; partners were not aligned. In one innovation 
ecosystem, this was the result of a lack of 
leadership; the focal entity did use social 
control, but most partners did not accept the 
focal entity as their leader. In the other 
innovation ecosystem, a lack of trust was found 
to result in a lack of a common culture. In the 
other two innovation ecosystems, social control 
was able to align partners. The focal entities 
spent quite some effort on the creation of 
commitment. Also, within these ecosystems, 
partners accepted the focal entity as their leader 
and an initial feeling of trust existed. Still, the 
use of social control could be more efficient 
when the focal entities would check its 
effectiveness in practice. Expectation gaps were 
found between the focal entities and the 
partners within the innovation ecosystems, 
strengthening the partners’ negative feeling 
towards alignment. To conclude, leadership, 
expectation management, and trust were likely 
influencing the alignment of partners by the use 
of social control.   
 
Behavioural control: how formal 
agreements influence people 
 
In three innovation ecosystems 
behavioural control was used from the start 
alongside social control to define roles, design 
meeting structures, and develop contracts. In 
one of these three ecosystems, the focal entity 
explicitly searched for commitment first and 
then roles were assigned. Within the fourth 
innovation ecosystem, the focal entity used 
behavioural control only after the 
implementation of social control. In fact, 
behavioural control was used to control the 
behaviour of the partners in the ecosystem 
following initial efforts to reach social consensus 
(Das and Teng, 1998). In that specific case, the 
focal entity defined partner roles, developed 
governance structures, defined responsibilities, 
and created structural agreements. Focal 
entities mainly used behavioural control to 
define responsibilities and structures.  
Focal leaders felt that behavioural 
control was successfully implemented, but 
partners disagreed. Especially within one 
innovation ecosystem, partners shared the 
opinion that there was no clear focal entity and 
that formal agreements were not compatible 
and based on intentions rather than official 
agreements. Partners in this ecosystem 
disagreed regarding the existence and use of 
conflict management; whereas one partner 
stated that internal conflict management was 
organized by the focal entity, the focal entity 
mentioned that conflicts were handled among 
partners. In a second innovation ecosystem, we 
observed that partners lacked understanding of 
the roles, contexts, and responsibilities, as 
illustrated by the following quote: 
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“There is a difference between program and 
community management, but what the exact 
differences are in terms of, for examples, roles is 
not clear to me.” 
 (Senior manager foundation) 
In one innovation ecosystem, the 
implementation of behavioural control was 
more successful. Partners understood why roles 
were specified and why meeting structures 
existed, as illustrated by the following quote:  
“There is a project manager for every project 
and it is clear why that structure was chosen.” 
(Senior manager foundation) 
The focal entity succeeded in the 
implementation of behavioural control, by 
stimulating discussions among partners when 
tensions or conflicts arose and verbally 
discussing how many resources would be spent 
on projects. This resulted in a feeling of 
understanding, transparency, and trust between 
the focal entity and the partners. The open 
communication between the focal entity and 
partners with respect to behavioural control and 
expectations contributed to the alignment of 
partners. Whereas one ecosystem succeeded in 
the use of communication and discussions, we 
also observed in another innovation ecosystem 
that when communication and transparency are 
limited, partner alignment is de-stimulated. As a 
result of a lack of partner alignment, trust was 
not present.  
Focal entities were challenged to 
successfully implement behavioural control. In 
line with social control, a mismatch was found 
between expectations from the focal entity and 
the partners in the ecosystem. The focal entities 
did not check whether behavioural control had 
the impact they aimed for. In one innovation 
ecosystem the focal entity did not facilitate 
open discussion and communication, negatively 
affecting partner alignment as partners, for 
example, did not understand which roles 
existed. In another innovation ecosystem, open 
discussions and communication were facilitated 
resulting in a feeling of trust; when the focal 
entity facilitated open discussions, 
communication, and transparency among 
partners, they understood why certain forms of 
control existed and conflicts were more easily 
resolved. Again the importance of leadership 
and trust on partner alignment was found. In 
one innovation ecosystem, a lack of leadership 
negatively affected partner alignment; partners 
did not understand what was expected, 
therefore not being able to produce the desired 
results of the focal entity. Also commitment 
turned out to be an important alignment 
stimulator, as within one innovation ecosystem 
we observed that the presence of commitment 
stimulated partners and the focal entity to get 
to know each other and discover what 
motivated partners. When commitment and 
motivations were understood, it was easier to 
assign roles that fitted the partners. Again, 
leadership turned out to be an important 
influencer. In one specific case, a lack of 
leadership negatively affected partner 
alignment; when partners did not understand 
what was expected of them, they were not able 
to produce the desired results. We found that 
partners felt that in the case of shared 
responsibility, no one is responsible. To 
conclude, communication, open discussions, 
trust, leadership, and commitment were 
influencing the alignment of partners through 
the use of behavioural control.  
 
Goodwill trust: do people even 
intend to fulfill their roles?  
 
The creation of goodwill trust was one 
of the biggest challenges for the focal entities. 
All kind of instruments were used to create a 
feeling of goodwill trust, like letters of intent, 
gentleman agreements, open communication, 
and a sense of moral responsibility. Most 
organizations that were attracted by focal 
entities already interacted before or were 
already part of the campus the ecosystem 
belonged to (in the case of three innovation 
ecosystems). Though the organizations had 
interacted before, most representatives of the 
organizations did not meet or collaborate 
before. Still, in all innovation ecosystems the 
majority of partners knew each other indirectly, 
as illustrated by the following quote: 
“A number of people knew each other and 
together we all knew someone; that was the 
inspiration for a coalition of the willing.”   
(Senior manager business) 
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One focal entity mentioned that the 
technological field where the ecosystem was 
active in represented a small community with 
many get-togethers. Organizations and 
representatives in this specific innovation 
ecosystem already met before at these get-
togethers, increasing goodwill trust.  
According to the literature, goodwill 
trust is increased in the case of previous 
collaborations between partners (Das and Teng, 
1998; Das and Teng, 2001). We found that in 
innovation ecosystems, also partners that did 
not collaborate before had the feeling that most 
of their fellow partners had the right intentions, 
though the intentions of a few were difficult to 
estimate.  
Though commitment was initially low, in 
three innovation ecosystems goodwill trust 
increased over time. Still, a number of events 
limited the presence of goodwill trust and thus 
partner alignment. In all four ecosystems it was 
observed that partners that once were part of 
the system were no longer present, resulting in 
a decrease of trust. Also, a few partners tended 
to behave opportunistically within all innovation 
ecosystems, waiting on others instead of 
undertaking action themselves.  
A number of partners that said to 
support the general idea, dropped out as soon 
as discussions started regarding implementation 
and task division; they only wanted to 
contribute when they benefitted directly. As a 
result of opportunistic behaviour, some partners 
did not dare to speak up as they feared that 
another partner would steal their ideas, as 
illustrated by the following quote: 
“As a result of partner X in the collaboration, 
partner Y was not completely open.” 
 (Senior manager banking) 
Within one innovation ecosystem, 
partners felt that the lack of a leader and 
internal organizational support of 
representatives and differences between the 
educational and market organizations prevented 
partner alignment. In another innovation 
ecosystem, we observed that partners felt that a 
number of organizations did not put the right 
person forward as representative; when 
representatives did not have the required 
knowledge or internal support, the alignment of 
partners was impeded.  
Within two innovation ecosystems, it 
was observed that leadership also can have a 
positive effect on goodwill trust. We noted that 
within one ecosystem partners felt that the focal 
entity was an accountable manager and a 
natural connector. The focal entity succeeded in 
increasing commitment and improving partner 
relations. Within another innovation ecosystem, 
the focal entity spent quite some time in 
pushing the partners in the right direction and 
stimulating open communication about 
expectations and trust. In both ecosystems, we 
found that goodwill trust was present.  
The examples show that there are a 
number of factors that influenced the alignment 
of partners in case of goodwill trust. In all four 
innovation ecosystems, focal entities tried to 
stimulate the development of goodwill trust. 
Not every focal entity was successful in doing so. 
Especially the role of leadership was found to 
have an important influence on partner 
alignment. Also a number of other factors like 
open communication and the presence of the 
right representatives were influencing partner 
alignment.  
 
Competence trust: the importance of 
knowledge and resources 
 
The focal entities of all four innovation 
ecosystems spent quite some time on attracting 
partners that could contribute the required 
resources and knowledge. The focal entities 
realized that attracting organizations with a 
good reputation and the right representatives 
would make their ecosystem more attractive, 
but it was a challenge to attract these partners 
as a result of both the uncertainty of innovations 
and external factors.  
One focal entity felt that the required 
knowledge and resources were not available as 
a result of laws and regulation that made it 
almost impossible to implement his vision.  
Two focal entities felt that in the case of 
disruptive innovation, it was not known what 
knowledge and resources were required, making 
it difficult to know upfront which partners had 
to be attracted. As it was difficult to attract the 
“right” partners, it was difficult for the focal 
entities to create competence trust and to align 
the partners.  
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The difficulty to create competence 
trust was clearly recognized among the partners. 
Though focal entities felt that it was difficult to 
attract the required knowledge and resources, 
we observed that in two innovation ecosystems 
partners felt that their partners had the right 
resources and knowledge. In one innovation 
ecosystem this was strengthened by the 
establishment of a foundation. Also, the 
attraction of well-known organizations increased 
the feeling that the right resources and 
knowledge were present.  
Despite the fact that partners felt that 
the required knowledge and resources were 
available within their partner organizations, still 
partners felt that the organizations did not 
allocate the required resources and knowledge 
to the ecosystem. This resulted in 
disappointment for a number of partners as 
they felt that they themselves did allocate 
substantial resources to the ecosystem. 
 We found that the allocation of 
resources and knowledge was related to the 
presence of an innovation department; 
organizations that had an innovation 
department often allowed their employees to 
spend a certain amount of time and resources 
on interesting projects, as illustrated by the 
following quote: 
“[…] partners with an independent innovation 
department are quicker in innovating.” (Senior 
manager banking) 
Partners within these two ecosystems 
felt that organizations with an innovation 
department allocated more resources and 
knowledge to the ecosystem. We observed that 
partners also felt that the allocation of required 
knowledge and resources was related to having 
the right representatives of an organization 
present within the innovation ecosystem. 
Representatives needed to have both support 
within their organization and a good network 
(e.g. to know who to contact in case of a lack of 
resources). Still, a number of potentially 
interesting partners were not attracted as 
partners that were present in the ecosystem 
feared that these partners could compete with 
them.  
In one innovation ecosystem partners 
felt that their fellow organizations did not have 
the required resources and knowledge; they felt 
that organizations did not have the right 
structures and employees in place to realize 
their commitments. Notwithstanding, partners 
felt that at least the intention existed to meet 
agreements.  
Again, a number of partners felt that a 
number of organizations did not put the right 
person forward as a representative. In the 
fourth innovation ecosystem partners felt that 
the right knowledge was found, but the required 
resources to implement it were missing, as 
illustrated by the following quote:  
“I think we potentially have the right knowledge 
in-house, but there are differences between 
people with respect to whether they are inspired 
to deliver it.”  
(Middle manager governmental organization) 
The four cases show that opinions 
regarding the presence of competence trust 
were divided; whereas some felt that knowledge 
and resources were present, but not allocated, 
others felt that either the knowledge or 
knowledge and resources were not present. It is 
difficult to identify the role of the focal entity in 
partner alignment in the case of competence 
trust, as the feelings among partners were 
mainly a result of interactions between partners.  
Nevertheless it was found that the 
presence of the right representatives and an 
innovation department within organizations 
stimulated partner alignment. Also having the 
right external factors, a foundation, and 
partners with a positive reputation influenced 
partner alignment.  
Focal entities tried to attract 
organizations that had the right representatives, 
positive reputations and innovation 
departments, but external factors and the 
establishment of a foundation were factors that 
could not be directly influenced by focal entities.  
 
DISCUSSION 
 
Based on the findings of this research, 
we conclude that the focal entity uses social 
control, behavioural control, competence trust 
and goodwill trust as governance mechanisms to 
influence partner alignment. In addition to these 
governance mechanisms, we found that an 
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additional variable exists that influences the 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms; the 
partner alignment stimulator. When present, 
the implementation of governance mechanisms 
becomes more effective as the impact that the 
focal entity aimed for is in line with how the 
partners experienced its impact, resulting in 
partner alignment. Also, some partner 
alignment stimulators, like leadership, seem to 
influence the alignment of partners directly. 
Focal entities that succeed in implementing 
partner alignment stimulators effectively, were 
better able to materialize their value proposition 
as a result of partner alignment. At first view a 
number of alliance management capabilities 
seem to be comparable with partner alignment 
stimulators, as summarized in table 4.
  
Table 4 Capabilities and stimulators 
Alliance management capability Partner alignment stimulator 
Bonding Trust, expectation management  
Communication  Communication  
Coordination  Leadership 
 
When looking at the model as 
represented in Figure 1, we note that in the case 
of innovation ecosystems, governance 
mechanisms are the mediating variable, 
whereas in alliances alliance management 
capabilities are the mediating variable. Despite 
the comparability in terms of the types of 
capabilities/stimulators, an innovation 
ecosystem seems to require a substantially 
different approach from alliances.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1 Governance mechanisms and partner alignment stimulators. 
 
In this paper, we have explored how 
focal entities influence the dynamics within 
innovation ecosystems by means of governance 
mechanisms. By doing so, we augment the 
existing innovation ecosystem literature in a 
number of ways. First, we augment existing 
work on innovation ecosystems by studying the 
implementation of trust and control by focal 
entities in innovation ecosystems. Until now, the 
importance of governance mechanisms and 
their implementation by the focal entity was 
only sparsely considered in the innovation 
ecosystem literature and no empirical research 
was done yet. It was not known yet how 
governance mechanisms were implemented nor 
which governance mechanism types were used. 
This research is among the first that uses 
empirical research to understand that the 
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governance mechanism types as implemented 
by the focal entity within innovation ecosystems 
are comparable to governance mechanism types 
as implemented within alliances.  
The main difference between the use of 
governance mechanisms within innovation 
ecosystems and the use of these mechanisms in 
alliances is that within an innovation ecosystem 
a focal entity implements the governance 
mechanisms to influence the behaviour of 
numerous partners, whereas in alliances one 
firm influences the behaviour of a limited 
number of partners.  
Second, we extend previous work on 
the impact of governance mechanisms on 
partners within the innovation ecosystem 
literature. Scholars had focused on the focal 
entity as a research object and on what types of 
governance mechanisms were used. To 
understand the impact that governance 
mechanisms have on partners, this research 
looks beyond the focal entity and integrates the 
views of different partners.  
As a result, we find that different 
governance mechanisms differ in how they align 
partners and that different partner alignment 
stimulators exist that influence the effectiveness 
of governance mechanisms in aligning partners. 
Third, we extend previous work on innovation 
ecosystems regarding the use of partner 
alignment stimulators. In alliance literature, 
alliance management capabilities were found 
that mediate the relation between governance 
structures and alliance performance. Though 
innovation ecosystems are a subset of alliances, 
partner alignment stimulators do not seem to 
mediate the relation between governance 
structures and partner alignment; rather, the 
governance mechanisms seem to be the 
mediating variable, as seen in Figure 1.  
Last, we extend previous work on 
innovation ecosystems by understanding the 
relation between governance mechanisms, focal 
entities, partners, and partner alignment. Until 
now, no empirical research was done yet on this 
combination of constructs.  
This research explores the applicability 
of constructs from the alliance literature to an 
innovation ecosystem context. We find that 
findings from the alliance literature can be partly 
applied to innovation ecosystems. Some 
concepts can be directly applied to innovation 
ecosystems, whereas some constructs function 
differently within innovation ecosystems. In an 
innovation ecosystem context, partner 
alignment stimulators are used, whereas in an 
alliance context, alliance management 
capabilities are used. By thoroughly researching 
the use of governance mechanisms by focal 
entities, we were able to create an initial 
understanding of how its use influences 
dynamics within innovation ecosystems.  
One governance mechanism described 
in the alliance literature, output control, was not 
used in innovation ecosystems. In alliances, 
output control is used to define what the 
preferred outcome will be at the end of an 
alliance. Often, alliances work with shorter time 
frames than innovation ecosystems and the final 
output is often discussed upfront (Roijakkers 
and Maes, 2017). Then output control is used to 
make sure that at the end of the alliance, the 
desired output is indeed obtained. Innovation 
ecosystems often focus on disruptive innovation 
or have a rather broad focus. Also, within 
innovation ecosystems, it is often not known 
upfront how long the collaboration will last. As a 
result, it can be questioned whether these types 
of ecosystems will ever be able to use output 
control as they are very dynamic. 
This research takes an important step 
towards further bridging the fields of alliances 
and ecosystems. As illustrated by table 4, 
characteristics of different governance 
mechanisms as used within innovation 
ecosystems are comparable with definitions 
from the alliance literature. The list of partner 
alignment stimulators matches only partly with 
alliance management capabilities and the effect 
of both variables was substantially different. 
Three alliance management capabilities are in 
line with the partner alignment stimulators that 
were found. It is not clear yet whether the 
differences in the effects of partner alignment 
stimulators and alliance management 
capabilities are the result of the characteristics 
of innovation ecosystems or the specific cases.  
Also, we do not understand yet why 
three out of six alliance management 
capabilities (interorganizational learning, 
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sensing, and transformation) are not present in 
innovation ecosystems. There is a probability 
that these three alliance management 
capabilities are not present in the four specific 
cases that we investigated for this study. It is 
also possible that they exist, but that we were 
not able to identify them.  
Last, it also could be that these three 
alliance management capabilities are higher-
order stimulators that are not present in 
emerging innovation ecosystems, and only are 
revealed in more mature innovation 
ecosystems. In the four specific cases under 
study, the focal entities of the four case studies 
are still struggling with their communication 
structures, were still bonding, and governance 
structures were not complete yet. Therefore, we 
assume that they are not ready yet to, for 
example, be alert to the environment (sensing), 
to move beyond routines (transformation) or to 
build new thinking (interorganizational learning).  
 
Future research directions 
 
This research has a number of 
limitations, which also suggest avenues for 
further research. First, this study is based on an 
in-depth case study of four innovation 
ecosystems. Therefore we expect that 
theoretical insights from this study may only be 
applicable in an innovation ecosystem context. 
Next to innovation ecosystems, a number of 
other ecosystem types have been identified in 
the literature (e.g. business ecosystem, 
knowledge-based ecosystem, service ecosystem, 
etc.).  
Future research could explore how 
governance mechanisms are used by focal 
entities within other ecosystem types and how 
the differences between these ecosystems 
influence the use of governance mechanisms. 
Some ecosystem types (e.g. service ecosystems) 
do not have a focal leader as present in 
innovation ecosystems. It could be interesting 
for future research to understand how 
governance mechanisms are used when for 
example no focal leader is present.  
Second, the four innovation ecosystems 
are active in four specific fields; artificial 
intelligence, blockchain, sustainability, and 
climate change. Therefore we expect that the 
theoretical insights from this study may only be 
applicable in innovation ecosystems with a 
comparable focus area, as each different focus 
area probably has its own specific implications 
that can influence the use of partner alignment 
stimulators. Also it is not known yet whether the 
mismatch between a number of partner 
alignment stimulators and alliance management 
capabilities is the result of the specificities of 
alliances and innovation ecosystems, or whether 
it is related to the nature of the four cases.  
Future research could explore whether 
governance mechanisms are influenced by 
comparable partner alignment stimulators in the 
case of innovation ecosystems with a different 
focus area. Also it could be assessed whether in 
different focus areas, comparable partner 
alignment stimulators are found.  
Last, future research could focus on 
understanding whether the differences between 
partner alignment stimulators and alliance 
management capabilities are the result of 
specificities of ecosystems compared to 
alliances, or that partner alignment stimulators 
are case-specific.  
Third, the four cases represent relatively 
young innovation ecosystems that are still in the 
development phase. We selected these kinds of 
innovation ecosystems since only in starting 
innovation ecosystems alignments structures 
are still being developed (Adner, 2017). As a 
result, the findings are only applicable to 
emerging innovation ecosystems.  
Future research could focus on more 
mature innovation ecosystems to understand 
whether the role of governance mechanisms 
changes over time and whether the importance 
of partner alignment stimulators still exists in 
later stages. Its understanding can contribute to 
the continuous stimulation of partner alignment 
in later stages of ecosystem development.  
Therefore we recommend that future 
researchers undertake longitudinal studies to 
understand how governance mechanisms and 
partner alignment stimulators develop over 
time. Also, in more mature innovation 
ecosystems the role of output control could be 
investigated, assuming that the output is more 
predictable in these stages. Therefore it could 
be interesting to investigate whether output 
 
Dieudonnee Cobben & Nadine Roijakkers 
 
 
_________________________________________________________________________________ 
 Int. J. Innov., São Paulo, v. 7, n. 1, pp. 01 - 25, January/April. 2019 
22 
control can be used in more mature innovation 
ecosystems.  
Fourth, as three out of four cases 
belong to the same program and the fourth 
ecosystem was completely independent from 
the program, generalizability may not be 
optimal. We found similarities among three out 
of four cases in terms of, for example, 
behavioural and social control. Still, these three 
cases were substantially different in terms of, 
for example, the number of partners, the 
technology used, and the focal entity.  
The fourth case differed substantially 
from the other three with respect to, for 
instance, the institutional environment and 
location. To increase generalizability, future 
research could focus on cases that are more 
comparable (e.g. all having a comparable 
institutional context).   
Fifth, the findings of this research are 
based on constructs from the alliance literature. 
Though innovation ecosystems are a subset of 
alliances, it is discussable whether these 
constructs can be applied directly to an 
innovation ecosystem context. We found that 
governance mechanisms from the alliance 
literature could be applied to innovation 
ecosystems when partner alignment stimulators 
were added.  
With respect to alliance management 
capabilities, however, only three out of six 
capabilities were recognized in innovation 
ecosystems while we assumed that the other 
three would also be present and the relations 
were different.  
Future research could focus on studying 
the use of partner alignment stimulators in 
more mature innovation ecosystems to 
understand whether the three management 
capabilities are either not present in innovation 
ecosystems or that they are only employed in 
later stages of development.  
Last, the findings in this research are 
based on an explorative, in-depth multiple case 
study.  
To increase the understanding of 
partner alignment stimulators and to test how 
strong their influence is on the effectiveness of 
governance mechanisms, future research could 
focus on the use of more elaborate quantitative 
research methods. Several scholars have made 
an attempt to define how alliance management 
capabilities can be measured (Schreiner et al., 
2009; Schilke and Goerzen, 2010).   
 
Managerial recommendations 
 
 We discovered a list of relevant partner 
alignment stimulators that enhance the 
effectiveness of governance mechanisms. It is 
important for managers to consider these 
stimulators when starting an innovation 
ecosystem. First, we recommend that managers 
consider the importance of leadership as it 
turned out to be one of the most important 
partner alignment stimulators.  
A manager should understand that 
innovation ecosystems require different 
management capabilities compared to existing 
management practices; a manager should be a 
natural connector, listener, visionary, decision-
maker, and expert. Also an effective manager 
should be able to make decisions regarding the 
future of the ecosystem (top-down) and, at the 
same time, he should be able to co-create with 
partners (bottom-up).  
A manager has to be flexible; he should 
take on different roles, depending on what a 
specific situation needs. To increase the success 
of innovation ecosystems, we recommend that 
managers consider the characteristics as 
described above when hiring future managers.  
Also we recommend that focal entities 
consider important leadership characteristics 
when managing an innovation ecosystem and 
educate the individuals that will lead an 
innovation ecosystem.  
Second, and related to the first 
implication, we recommend that managers 
consider the importance of communication and 
management structures. A manager has to 
understand that every partner has its own 
specific uncertainties and ways to deal with 
them as well as his personal expectations. Only 
when a partner feels that a manager or focal 
entity understands him, he will do the best he 
can to perform.  
To understand his partners, a manager 
should be transparent, open, thorough, and a 
good listener. These characteristics will 
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contribute to a sense of transparency and 
openness among the focal entity and partners. 
Also, structures can be designed to effectively 
manage the expectations of partners. Managers 
need to be transparent and open to ensure that 
partners feel that they can share their concerns 
and expectations.  
To increase the success of innovation 
ecosystems, we recommend that managers 
have open and transparent communication 
structures in place and design an expectation 
management structure.  
Last, we recommend that managers 
consider the importance of resource allocation. 
Only when every partner contributes resources 
and knowledge to the innovation ecosystem, it 
will be possible to create synergies and to 
innovate collaboratively. For some partners it is 
difficult to find support within their own 
organizations for the allocation of resources, 
whereas some partners simply do not have the 
required knowledge and resources. Another 
group of partners may not prioritize resource 
allocation to the ecosystem.  
Managers should understand why 
partners are not allocating resources to the 
ecosystem. When, for example, the required 
resources or knowledge are not available, 
managers could negotiate with a partner the 
contribution of resources that they do have. To 
increase resource allocation, we recommend 
that managers first investigate why partners are 
not allocating resources to the ecosystem and 
only then take appropriate actions.   
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